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Abstract This paper applies the framework for pro-poor analysis to welfare changes
from a CGE-microsimulation model to analyze what are the better or worse models
for agriculture modernization, and to estimate the contribution of growth and redistri-
bution to changes in poverty in DRC. The findings indicate that labor-using techno-
logical change generates absolute and relative pro-poor effects whereas capital-using
technological change leads to immiserizing growth. More importantly, the results
suggest that labor-using technological change can be independently sufficient for re-
ducing poverty via the income growth effects. This study also highlights how devel-
oping input supply networks, securing tenure among smallholders, and improving
access to land for women are important for pro-poor agricultural modernization.
Keywords Agricultural modernization · Technological change · Pro-poor growth ·
Input reform · CGE-microsimulation
JEL Classification C68 · D33 · O33 · Q10 · Q18
1 Introduction
Agricultural transformation is essential for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
because it has huge potential to spur growth and raise income. Agriculture employs
most of the labor in DRC and produces the largest percentage of total value added.
Figure 1 shows that agriculture employs 60.2 percent of the Congolese labor force and
generates about 21 percent of total value added. Sectors such as textiles, chemicals,
construction, and forestry only produce a small share of value added and contribute
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Fig. 1 Profile of sectoral
employment and value added
(2005). Source: Author’s based
on DRC national accounts
(2005)
marginally to employment creation. Figure 1 further indicates that agriculture and
trade sectors lie below the 45-degree line, meaning that the share of employment in
these sectors is higher than the share of value added from these sectors. However, the
largest gap between the contribution to value added and employment appears to be
in agriculture. This indicates that agriculture has the lowest productivity in DRC’s
economy.
Agriculture is the most unproductive sector in DRC because of inconsistent and
uncoordinated agricultural development strategies, coupled with conflict and the pro-
gressive withdrawal of the government from supporting agricultural activities. Ac-
cording to Otchia (2013b), government policy implemented since 1966 led to the
collapse of large-scale commercial agriculture, favored subsistence agriculture, and
distorted economic incentives against agriculture. In addition to this, the government
removed all subsidies and price support measures to agriculture in 2002. Conse-
quently, farmers use a rudimentary agricultural technology mostly based on outdated
production methods and inputs. Agriculture also faces high transaction costs due to
the lack of infrastructure most of which was destroyed during political conflicts. Low
productivity in agriculture entails unstable and low paid jobs. As a result, an over-
whelming proportion of agricultural workers are poor. Four out of every five rural
poor work in agriculture. In urban areas, agriculture accounts for one-third of the
poor.
Nevertheless, agriculture is still attracting labor in both urban and rural areas. Ac-
cording to Herderschee et al. (2012), agriculture provided employment for 10 million
people in 2005 and 15 million in 2010. Despite the low productivity, labor accrues in
agriculture because it can produce the amount of food necessary for their subsistence.
This implies that most of the farming activities are of a small scale and aim to increase
food security. Given its low productivity, increasing the amount of labor and land is
the only way to raise production in agriculture. Labor flows to subsistence farming
as it uses essentially manual work, whereas large-scale farmers tend to expand land.
Indeed, DRC is far from reaching the agriculture frontier, as it uses only 11 per-
cent of the 80 million hectares of arable non-forest land for agriculture. However, in
recent years, much of agricultural land has been developed for export-oriented large-
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scale commercial agriculture.1 These agricultural investments are made by foreign
investors to secure their own food needs. This constrains access to land for small-
scale farmers.
Against this background, agricultural productivity improvement is the fundamen-
tal policy to initiate agricultural transformation and raise income of the poor (Alvarez-
Cuadrado and Poschke 2011; Ngai and Pissarides 2007). The reason is that pro-
ductivity improvement “pushes” labor out of agriculture and increases farmers’ real
wages; “pulls” jobs in sectors that use agriculture as inputs; and increase supply of
affordable food in the economy. The empirical literature reports strong and robust
effects of agriculture productivity on poverty (Thirtle et al. 2003; Irz et al. 2001;
de Janvry and Sadoulet 2010). However, the magnitude of poverty reduction due to
agricultural productivity growth varies largely across countries, depending on the way
they developed and used new technologies (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2010).
The literature documents a range of policies to increase agriculture productiv-
ity and enhance income-increasing structural change.2 Among them, technological
change has been acknowledged as the principal driver of productivity growth (OECD
2012; Morris et al. 2007; DFID 2006). However, it is worth mentioning that the inno-
vation, selection, and adoption of new technologies depend on the agriculture frontier,
factor endowment, and market imperfections. Hayami and Ruttan (1970) used data on
agriculture inputs to assess how endowment drove the direction of technical change
in the US and Japan during 1880–1960. They found that land abundance in the US
favored labor-saving technological change while the land scarcity in Japan led to the
development and adoption of land-saving technologies. As a mechanization strategy,
labor-saving technological change consists of using tractors and machinery, whereas
land-saving technological change focuses on biological and chemical innovations.
A recent successful case of land-saving technological change occurred during the
Green Revolution in Asia. The Green Revolution was an intensifying of input-based
production characterized by the use of high-yielding and fertilizer-efficient new vari-
eties of seed (rice and wheat). Policymakers initiated this type of agricultural transfor-
mation to increase food production and reduce hunger and malnutrition in the 1960s.
Hence, it is conceptually clear that the Green Revolution increased agriculture and
food production. Empirical results also indicate that it led to poverty reduction as it
raised farmers’ income and increased food affordability.
Though it is expected that agricultural productivity improvement tends to reduce
poverty, the extent to which it reduces inequality and benefits small-scale farmers is
still open to question. For instance, the pro-poorness of the Green Revolution has
been disputed, since its effectiveness in reducing inequality is not straightforward.
The main argument states that the Green Revolution worsened income distribution
as it was biased in favor of larger farmers and missed the poorer subsistence small-
scale farmers (Das 1998; Griffin 1979; Freebairn 1995; Goldman and Smith 1995).
1According to http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/17/green-rush/, half of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo’s agricultural lands are being leased to grow crops, including palm oil for the production of biofuels.
2There are policies within agriculture and outside agriculture. However, this research focuses on policies
within agriculture.
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Furthermore, it increased landless farmers and the demand for unskilled labor, which
in turn lowered wage laborers (Hazell and Ramasamy 1991; Glaeser 1987; Cleaver
1972).
Despite this, the experience of Asia points to a clear consensus on the role of strong
public policies and investment in creating a pro-poor Green Revolution (Eicher 1995;
Smale 1995; Hazell 2009). These policies include agricultural research and develop-
ment, irrigation, rural roads, access to credit, and price support policies. In addition,
those policies had been successful when they have been implemented together. How-
ever, there is no empirical assessment on the pro-poorness of technological change
and the complementary rural development policies in Africa, especially in DRC.
This paper thus aims to assess what are the better and worse models for agri-
cultural modernization in DRC. Agricultural transformation is qualified as a better
model only if it is centered on small-scale farmers as most of them are poor and have
limited resource endowment relative to other farmers. To put it differently, a better
model for agricultural modernization produces pro-poor effects where poor house-
holds gain relative to the richer ones. Several recent studies have looked at the pro-
poor effects of policies, particularly using CGE-microsimulation model (Boccanfuso
et al., 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Annabi et al. 2008; Ravallion and Lokshin 2008). Most
of the studies do not show factors behind the differences in the impacts of policy on
pro-poor growth or decompose the changes in poverty into growth and distribution
components, but rather show how poor benefit/lose relative to rich segments of the
population. Boccanfuso and Kaboré (2004), however, did find that the relationship be-
tween poverty, growth, and inequality relationship is heterogeneous and conditional
on context.
To look at the pro-poorness of different strategies for modernizing agriculture,
I combine three techniques, namely a computable general equilibrium model, a
household-survey based microsimulation, and least square regressions. I adopt a se-
quential approach that can be described in four steps. In the first step, I evaluate the
effects of agricultural modernization strategies on employment, wages, and rents, and
the price of goods and services. I use a CGE-microsimulation model that captures var-
ious links through which agricultural modernization affects households. These links
include the return to labor and land, the price of goods, the impact on non-agriculture
sector, and sectoral labor mobility. Then I feed the changes from the CGE model into
a microsimulation model, which takes into account household heterogeneity in terms
of factor endowments and consumption patterns, to generate welfare gains or losses
at the household level. Using these welfare changes, in the third step I apply the pro-
poor growth framework to assess which of the agricultural modernization strategies
is pro-poor and the extent to which growth and redistribution contribute to welfare
changes, following Annabi et al. (2008). Finally, I select a strategy that produced
pro-poor welfare gains in the previous stage, and use a least square regression as in
Ravallion and Lokshin (2008) to quantify the determinants of pro-poor agricultural
modernization at the household level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
agricultural sector in DRC. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of agricul-
tural modernization, while Sect. 4 explains the features of the CGE-microsimulation
model and presents an analytical framework for pro-poor analysis. Section 5 dis-
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cusses and presents the results of policy experiments. Finally, Sect. 6 provides a sum-
mary of the results and lessons for policymakers.
2 Overview of the Congolese Agricultural Sector
The Congolese economy depends on the agricultural sector, which contributes more
than 20 percent of the country’s GDP. However, it is important to note that the im-
portance of agriculture is not a result of improved agricultural production. Rather,
it is due to the marked reduction of mining production, which declined faster than
agriculture. In recent years, agriculture became an urban phenomenon, especially
for food security reasons and proximity to markets. Urban or peri-urban farming in
the DRC is not only a response to the rise in food insecurity; it also serves as an
income-generating activity because of the increasing demand for vegetables in cities
and soaring food prices. As a result, the agricultural sector has become the second
largest employer for urban workers after the trade sector. This section describes some
key characteristics and features of agriculture in DRC, relevant to the problems un-
der review. These are (a) land size and distribution; (b) fertilizer use; (c) production
and productivity; (d) agricultural trade patterns; and (e) agriculture’s contribution to
poverty.
2.1 Land Size and Distribution
Land is a very important asset for DRC farmers for its economic, cultural and spir-
itual significance. Due to bad governance (corrupted judiciary system, weaken tra-
ditional land rights, flawed land law (uncertain land rights, outdated land registry),
however, land has become the key driver of conflict in the eastern part of the coun-
try (Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005; Huggins 2010). The most core issue in conflicts
over land concerns limited access to land, land succession problem, and inequitable
distribution. There are other factors behind land issues in DRC, such as coloniza-
tion, land grab, migration, and climate change (Long 2011; Chausse et al. 2012;
African Union et al. 2012). The consequences of these measures and events are visi-
ble in all their extent: increased landless and reduced average land size.
For instance, the highly skewed nature of land distribution in DRC is evident if one
looks at Fig. 2 where I plot the value of land per household, per capita and per adult
across three locations, namely urban, peri-urban, and rural areas. The figures indicate
that farms are very small; the average land holding per household is in order of 1.3
hectare (ha) in urban areas and around 2 ha in peri-urban and rural areas, whereas the
median of land per household is 0.8 in urban areas, and 1 ha in peri-urban and rural
areas. The median are about 50 percent lower than the mean, implying the existence
of high land inequality. Moving to the per capita distribution, panel (b) of Fig. 2
shows that average land per capita is 0.3 hectares in urban areas, while it is 0.4 and
0.6 hectares in peri-urban and rural areas. Despite the dominance of small farms, it
is interesting to note that the average land per capita is not much of issue as it ranks
DRC among countries with more than an average of potential agricultural land. On
average, land per adult is a bit more than half a hectare in urban areas but nearly
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Fig. 2 Boxplots for land size
1 hectare in peri-urban and 1.15 hectares in rural areas. As one would expect, the
average land per adult is significantly higher in rural areas because of migration to
urban areas.
The significant discrepancies between mean and median land size suggest the lim-
itation of the figures to assess land distribution in DRC. Therefore, I complement the
land distribution analysis by decomposing the Gini coefficient of inequality between
urban, peri-urban, and rural areas. In this study, I decompose the Gini coefficient into
three components, namely a within-group inequality term, a between-group inequal-
ity term, and an overlap term. The within-group inequality term is a weighted sum of
the inequalities calculated for each area (urban, peri-urban, rural), whereas weights
depend on the population and land share of each area. The between-group inequality
term is calculated on the total population where the land size of each person in the
area is replaced by the average land size in the area where he lives. This component
of inequality thus indicates the mean difference across areas. The overlap term is a
residual term that arises because the areas’ land size ranges overlap. It reflects the
interaction effect among groups.3
Based on the figures on Table 1, it appears that the overall Gini coefficient of land
per household is 0.46, indicating that land inequality is very high in DRC. Table 1
also shows a more unequal land distribution in terms of land per capita, as the Gini
of 0.56 indicates. Comparing these estimates to those of the sub-region reported by
Jayne et al. (2003), it appears that DRC has an unequal land distribution than Zam-
bia and Mozambique, where the Gini index of land per household is 0.44 and 0.45,
respectively, and the Gini of land per capita is 0.50 and 0.51. Jayne et al. (2003) re-
port higher Gini of land per household for Rwanda (0.52), Kenya (0.55) and Ethiopia
3See Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982), Lambert and Aronson (1993) and Lambert and Decoster (2005).
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Fig. 3 Fertilizer use. Source:
Author’s creation based on
FAOSTAT
(0.55) than DRC. In addition, the distribution of land per capita in DRC is similar to
Ethiopia (0.56) but more unequal than in Rwanda (0.54) or Ethiopia (0.55).
Furthermore, Table 1 indicates that land distribution is more unequal in rural area,
as the Gini of rural area is higher for land per household, land per capital, or land per
adult. Similarly, rural area is the most responsible of land inequality, as it contributes
to 61 percent of total land inequality. This leads the within-area inequality become
high in explaining land inequality than the between-area inequality. The high share
of within-sector term calls for attention in reducing land inequality in rural sector.
2.2 Fertilizer Use
Now, I turn to the use of fertilizer in DRC. Figure 3 compares the use of fertilizers
in DRC and some African countries. One can see that DRC uses less fertilizer than
its neighboring countries. Between 2006 and 2010, the average intensity of fertilizer
use in DRC was only 0.47 kg/ha, while it reached 46.51 and 36.69 kg/ha in South
Africa and Morocco. High cost of fertilizers is the main reason that limits the fer-
tilizer use in DRC. Most of these costs are due to imports and transportation costs,
as DRC imports about 10,000 metric tons of fertilizer annually. According to Nweke
et al. (2000), most of farmers in DRC have low incentive to invest in fertilizer because
imported wheat and rice are available at competitive price in nearby commercial mar-
kets. Unavailability of credit and support price measures for dealers and farmers plays
a major role in limited use of fertilizer. In fact, fertilizer import business in DRC is
too small and unstable to ensure its survival.
The other factors for low fertilizer use are the lack of adequate knowledge about
fertilizers, bad quality of available fertilizers, poor extension services, and local farm-
ing practice. Mumvwela (2004) stated that farmers in western DRC use also less of
livestock manure that are available. Despite the low intensity of fertilizer use, it is in-
teresting to see that DRC is rapidly increasing the amount of fertilizer. Figure 3 also
shows that DRC increased by 300 percent the use of fertilizer between 2006–2010
and 2002–2004. Nevertheless, there is still much to do, as yields have not responded
yet to the increase of fertilizers.
Journal of Economic Structures (2014) 3:8 Page 9 of 43
2.3 Agricultural Production and Productivity Trends
Table 2 shows the growth rates of production of the main agricultural products in the
DRC between 1960 and 2010. The main food crops (cassava, plantains, and maize)
accounted for 80 percent of total agricultural production, while cash crops repre-
sented less than 15 percent.
Data in Table 2 reveal a widely varying pattern of production growth rates among
the different agricultural products over 1960–2010. This is the result of uncoordinated
agricultural development strategies, coupled with conflict and the progressive with-
drawal of the government from supporting agricultural activities. Cash crops were
the backbone of DRC agriculture in the 1960s. In particular, palm oil generated half
of total export earnings and made the DRC the second largest exporter of this crop
in the world. As a result of a succession of policy strategies and measures, however,
the production of cash crops (rubber, sugar, coffee, and cotton, in addition to palm
oil) declined starting in the early 1970s. For instance, the production of palm oil fell
from 224,000 metric tons in 1961 to 187,000 metric tons in 2011. This coincided
with the implementation of goal no. 80 of a 10-year plan of industrialization through
domestic and external loans. The collapse of cash crop production was accelerated by
“Zaïrianization” (1973–1974), a policy of expropriation of foreign-owned production
units by the government, which then handed them over to nationals. This policy led
to the collapse of large-scale commercial agriculture, favored subsistence agriculture,
distorted economic incentives against agriculture (Otchia 2013a), and led to conflicts.
Growth in palm oil production resumed in the 1990s as a result of another agricultural
and rural development plan, Le Plan Directeur,4 but could not be sustained because
of looting (1991–1993) and war (1998–2002).
War and civil conflict in the 1990s negatively affected production of food crops
as well. Table 2 indicates that sweet potatoes, plantains, rice, cassava, and bananas
experienced a large drop during 1990–2000. In spite of this decline, the agricultural
sector has continued to serve as the backbone of the Congolese economy. Growth
of agricultural production, especially food crops, resumed during 2000–2010. Pro-
duction of soybeans, which are grown extensively for their nutritional qualities, grew
by 25.6 percent, while that of plantains and bananas grew by 14.4 and 13.4 percent,
respectively. However, as long as production technology remains rudimentary and
producers lack improved varieties and inputs, the growth of food crop production
continues to depend on available quantities of the basic production factors of land
and labor. For example, the harvested area of sweet potatoes and paddy rice grew by
23.3 and 11.7 percent, respectively, from 2000 to 2010.
Concerning agricultural productivity, panel (a) of Fig. 4 displays agricultural land
productivity and the per capita capital stock in land development, while panel (b)
plots agricultural labor productivity and per capita capital stock in machinery and
equipment.5 As can be seen, land productivity increased between 1980–1989 and
4This plan aimed to design regional and sectoral strategies to promote food security, and to define the role
of the state and the private sector.
5Land productivity indicates the total output per hectare of agricultural land, whereas labor productivity is
expressed as the value of agricultural production per agricultural worker. Both land and labor productivity
are expressed in 2004–2006 USD.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Economic Structures (2014) 3:8 Page 11 of 43
Fig. 4 Labor and land productivity in DRC and neighboring countries. Source: Author’s creation based
on FAOSTAT
1990–1999, but dropped afterward due to the collapse of infrastructure and frequent
displacement of farmers during the war period. Labor productivity, on the other
hand, decreased continuously starting in 1980–1989, and then fell drastically be-
tween 1990–1999 and 2000–2007. Land and labor productivities in DRC are low
and decreasing for various reasons, including the lack of investment in accumulating
capabilities, low fertilizer use, land size, war and displacement, the informal charac-
ter of agriculture, and the rudimentary nature of technology used in this sector. For
instance, Fig. 4 indicates that per capita stock in land, and machinery and equipment
development is decreasing since 1980–1989.
2.4 Agricultural Trade Patterns
Exports from the DRC, after having more than doubled from 1961–1980, decreased
sharply during 1980–2000, as shown in Table 3. The reason is that the development
policies implemented during the latter period, such as Zaïrianization, undermined the
viability of large-scale agricultural projects and disrupted the maintenance of rural
infrastructure and support services, as discussed in the previous section. Exports of
palm oil, rubber, and cotton collapsed in the 1990s, and in later years DRC agricul-
tural exports came to be dominated by bran of wheat and coffee, which amounted to
62.8 percent of such exports in 2010.
Since the level of food production is low, the DRC dependency on imported food
has increased. Table 4 indicates that food imports increased approximately 40-fold
between 1960 and 2010, from $23 million in 1960 to $977 million in 2010. Major
imports included flours of wheat and maize, sugar, palm oil, and meat. As can also be
seen in the table, the DRC only started to import significant amounts of maize, sugar,
and palm oil in 2000.
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Table 3 Agricultural exports, selected years
1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total agricultural exports (thousand constant $) 107,340 112,196 234,839 139,080 39,308 75,120
Export share in total agricultural exports (percent)
Bran of wheat 0.00 0.00 16.25 14.63 41.12 52.09
Cocoa beans 1.23 1.43 2.26 3.28 4.84 2.09
Coffee, green 8.27 16.74 40.16 63.54 50.02 10.75
Cotton lint 3.71 2.48 1.19 0.00 0.34 0.00
Palm oil 37.62 34.08 5.42 0.00 0.00 0.90
Rubber nat dry 9.18 9.86 10.55 4.25 0.27 1.03
Tea 1.23 1.73 0.79 1.59 0.15 0.16
Other 38.76 33.69 23.37 12.71 3.25 32.98
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Author’s calculations, based on FAOSTAT
Table 4 Food imports, selected years
1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total food imports (thousand constant $) 22,792 61,887 156,900 241,393 214,424 977,293
Import share in total agricultural imports (percent)
Wheat 0.03 0.00 39.60 29.36 21.34 28.66
Flour of maize 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.47 13.18
Flour of wheat 32.47 27.82 1.76 11.37 18.03 9.68
Sugar raw centrifugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.79 8.95
Palm oil 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 5.61
Chicken meat 0.65 0.41 0.95 4.30 2.52 4.19
Rice—total (rice milled equivalent) 14.81 8.52 6.19 16.60 10.95 3.41
Malt 15.43 12.43 4.76 4.88 3.14 3.31
Other 36.60 50.82 46.74 33.49 27.83 23.01
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Author’s calculations, based on FAOSTAT
2.5 Agriculture and Poverty
Figure 5 plots the breakdown of the poverty headcount by sectors of activity,6 i.e.
agriculture and other sectors, and compares it across urban and rural areas. This al-
lows for evaluating the contribution of agriculture to poverty reduction. The figure
clearly shows that the agricultural sector is home to the poor. In rural areas, where
the poverty rate is extremely high, 83.4 percent of poor households work in agricul-
6The consumption per adult equivalent used in this study was adjusted using FAO’s adult equivalent scale
from FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) and Collier et al. (2008).
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Fig. 5 Distribution of poverty
by economic sector in 2005
(percent). Source: Author’s
computations, based on the 2005
household and informal
producer survey (Enquête 1-2-3)
ture, while only 16.6 percent of the rural poor work in other sectors. In urban areas,
the agricultural sector accounts for 34.4 percent of the poor population, which is still
very high compared to the trade and transportation sectors.7 At the national level, the
share of poor households that work in agriculture is 63.4 percent. It can thus be con-
cluded that high poverty rates and the recent rise in rural poverty are at least partly
related to the fall in labor and land productivity in agriculture described in Sect. 2.3.
Turning to the structure of budget shares and their distribution across groups,
Table 5 reports a product-disaggregated breakdown of consumption expenditure by
deciles of the income distribution. Here the interest is in examining how the expen-
Table 5 Distribution of consumption by expenditure group (percent)
Products Expenditure group (decile)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Food consumption 72.1 72.0 71.8 71.1 70.2 68.9 71.3 68.0 64.8 52.7
Marketed 40.1 40.2 41.8 42.3 43.9 47.1 51.7 51.5 54.8 48.5
Home-produced consumption 32.0 31.8 30.0 28.8 26.3 21.8 19.6 16.5 10.0 4.2
Beverage and tobacco 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.8 2.2 2.8 1.9
Clothing and footwear 3.5 3.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.2 4.7 4.3 6.0
Housing, electricity, gas, water 15.8 14.3 13.6 12.9 14.0 13.7 12.3 13.2 13.8 16.2
Medical care 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.5 3.0 2.9 4.2
Transportation and communications 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.1 1.7 2.8 3.9 8.6
Education 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 3.0
Recreation and culture 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.2
Restaurant and hotels 0.9 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.3 2.2 2.8
Other services 1.1 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations, based on the 2005 household and informal producer survey (Enquête 1-2-3)
7In the DRC, the trade and transportation sectors account for 20.7 and 9.1 percent, respectively, of em-
ployment of the urban poor.
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diture allocation across different consumption items evolves with the income level of
the household. Several points are worth noting. Looking first at food expenditure, it
is important to highlight the importance of food consumption in Congolese house-
holds’ expenditure. Table 5 shows that Congolese households allocate the highest
share of their expenditure to food consumption, and that this share decreases for rich
households, following Engel’s Law. Apart from food consumption, the category that
includes housing, electricity, gas, and water represents the second largest expendi-
ture item. The share of this category is almost homogeneous across all households,
averaging 14 percent of total expenditure. The expenditure breakdown implies that
after households cover their needs in food and housing, they have little money left
for other services such as education and medical care. This is especially true for poor
households: as can be seen, the share of education in total expenditure for the three
lowest deciles is close to 1 percent.
In order to obtain more detailed information on food consumption patterns, Table 5
disaggregates food expenditure into market goods consumption and home-produced
consumption. The food consumption pattern varies significantly using this disaggre-
gation. Market food consumption represents 40 percent of poor households’ expen-
diture, and this share increases with income. This means that rich households spend
a larger share of their income on market goods than poor households. Looking at the
home-produced consumption pattern also provides some important insights for pol-
icymakers. Home-produced consumption represents 32 percent of total expenditure
for the poorest decile, which is approximately half of their food consumption expen-
diture, but this share declines significantly with income. It is 26.3 percent for the fifth
income group decile, 10 percent for the ninth decile, and 4 percent for the richest
decile.
Figure 6 extends the expenditure analysis by plotting the kernel density estimates
of urban and rural households for food consumption.8 The figure plots the estimated
density function of food consumption per adult equivalent for urban and rural house-
holds. It can be clearly seen that the distribution of the log of food consumption per
adult equivalent for urban households is skewed to the left, while for rural households,
the distribution is slightly skewed to the right. Two vertical lines represent the food
expenditure poverty line for urban and rural areas.9 This enables one to assess the
potential impact of growth on poverty reduction. The figure shows that the distance
between the poverty line and the mode of urban per capita expenditure distribution
is not large. From a poverty reduction policy perspective, this implies that it would
require only a very small increase in per adult equivalent food consumption to move
many households out of poverty in urban areas. In rural areas, however, the mode of
the density function is quite far from the rural food poverty line. This indicates the
need for poverty reduction policies capable of increasing incomes of the poor more
8In this study, I apply kernel density instead of a regression of food expenditure on income per capita in
urban and rural areas because the main focus is to analyze the distribution of food expenditure relative to
the poverty line.
9The food expenditure poverty lines were taken from the National Statistics Institute, which established the
food expenditure poverty line at 123,070 Congolese francs for urban areas, and at 82,755 Congolese francs
for rural areas. I thus represent the log of the urban food expenditure poverty line by the solid vertical line
at the value of 11.72 and the log of the rural food expenditure poverty line by the dashed vertical line at
11.32.
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Fig. 6 Kernel density function
of households by per adult
equivalent food consumption
Source: Author’s computations,
based on the 2005 household
and informal producer survey
(Enquête 1-2-3)
in the rural sector than in the urban sector in order to achieve similar reductions in
poverty rates.
3 Theoretical Consideration
The literature on technological change in agriculture documents that countries tend to
adopt the technology that can raise the productivity of the scarce factor or the factor
with the lowest quality. Countries with scarce labor but abundant land and capital
tend to adopt labor-saving technologies such as tractors and machinery. Countries
with scarce land but abundant labor tend to adopt land-saving types of technologies
such as chemical and biological high-yield technologies. Hayami and Ruttan (1985)
provide a theoretical framework of this type of biased technological change based on
the induced innovation hypothesis. According to this theory, innovation is induced
as a response to changes in relative prices, which push firms to innovate in order to
use less of the resource that has become more expensive. However, the hypothesis
of biased technical change as hypothesized by Hayami and Ruttan may not hold in
low income and sub-Saharan countries (Cuffaro 1997). In most of these countries,
land and labor are abundant, but capital is scarce, and land inequality is high so that
most of the farmers are smallholders. Thus, the theory of induced innovation cannot
hold for the following reasons: (1) demand for innovation for small- and large-scale
farms is different; (2) small- and large-scale farms have different influence on public
research; (3) imported technology is absent in induced innovation theory.
In this study, the concept of pro-poor agricultural modernization refers to the ad-
vancement of agriculture technologies and institutions that improve the poor and
small-scale farmers’ welfare relative to rich large-scale farmers. This means that
agricultural modernization includes mechanization strategy as part of technological
change and the modernization of agriculture behavior, structure and institutions. The
choice of the technology, which depends on the factor price and public policies, must
be centered on the technological need of small-scale farmers.
The process of agriculture modernization includes mechanization and chemical-
ization. Mechanization comes with higher capital intensity whereas chemicalization
implies that farmers adopt practices that increase the efficiency in the use of fertilizer
and chemicals required to produce a certain level of outputs. This scheme includes
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also organic farming that maintains soil fertility to avoid the overuse of chemicals.
Given the actual price and subsidies level, this technological path enables farmers to
make effective and efficient use of the limited amount of fertilizer. These practices
include crop rotation or integrated livestock crop rotation, intercropping, cover crop-
ping or green manure, and composting waste materials. Finally, it is worth noting that
achieving agricultural mechanization requires institutional changes that increase trust
and encourage the private sector to adapt progressively proven technologies to local
practices and production modes (Thirtle et al. 1998). In the case of DRC, public in-
terventions are required to improve access to markets for inputs, outputs and finance,
as transaction costs are very high.
4 Methods
To evaluate the pro-poorness of agricultural modernization-led growth, I adopt a
sequential approach that combines a CGE model to a microsimulation model aug-
mented to incorporate a pro-poor growth framework. The empirical strategy proceeds
in four steps, as Fig. 7 depicts. I first use the CGE model to generate the effects
of agricultural modernization strategies on employment, wages and rents, and the
price of goods and services. Then I transmit these changes into a microsimulation
model, which takes into account household heterogeneity in terms of factor endow-
ments and consumption patterns, to generate welfare gains or losses at the household
level. Using these changes in welfare, I apply the pro-poor growth framework to as-
sess which of the agricultural modernization strategies is pro-poor, and the extent
to which growth and redistribution contribute to welfare changes. Finally, I select a
strategy that produced pro-poor welfare gains in the previous stage, and use a least
square regression to explain its characteristics.
4.1 Congolese Computable General Equilibrium Model
The general specification of the Congolese CGE model follows the basic structure of
the single-country model as described by Dervis et al. (1982). However, I closely fol-
low Arndt et al. (2000) and Lofgren et al. (2013) for the specification of many struc-
tural and empirical features of the Congolese economy, namely an explicit modeling
of trade and transportation costs for marketed commodities and relatively detailed
description of home production. A full description of the CGE model can be found
in Otchia (2014).
The Congolese CGE model is mainly calibrated to the social accounting matrix of
the DRC for the year 2005 (Otchia 2013a). However, additional data were required to
fully run the CGE model, including household demand elasticities, trade elasticities,
and production elasticities. Household demand elasticities include income elastic-
ity and the Frisch parameter and were estimated based on the Enquête 1-2-3 survey
data.10 Trade elasticities include elasticities for the Armington and transformation
10The Enquête 1-2-3 is a mixed household-informal producer survey on employment, the informal sector,
and consumption conducted in 2005 by the DRC’s National Statistics Institute (Institut National de Statis-
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Fig. 7 CGE-microsimulation augmented with pro-poor growth framework
functions. Armington elasticities represent the elasticity of substitution in demand
between imported commodities and domestic goods; whereas transformation elastic-
ities include substitution elasticities among primary inputs in the value-added produc-
tion function. For the case of the Congo, no trade elasticity was found due to the lack
of time series data. Therefore, trade elasticities used in this study are from the Global
Trade and Analysis Project based on Dimaranan (2006). Finally, production elastici-
ties, which are drawn from the empirical CGE literature for African economies, vary
between 0.3 and 1.2.11
4.2 Microsimulation Model
The microsimulation model includes 12,098 households from the Enquête 1-2-3. My
framework posits that agricultural technological change affects household income
tique). This survey is carried out in three phases. The first phase collects information about employment
and households’ economic condition and activities. The data collected through the first phase are used to
identify household unincorporated enterprises (households whose production unit is not incorporated as
a legal entity separate from the owner), which serve as statistical units for the next phase. The goal of
the second phase is to provide information on business conditions, economic performance, and production
linkages of the household unincorporated enterprises. Finally, the third phase uses the typical household
budget survey to collect information on household consumption.
11Production elasticities which include factor substitution elasticities, take lower value (0.3∼0.8) for agri-
culture, forestry and mining.
Page 18 of 43 C.S. Otchia
through channels such as changes in price of goods and services, changes in em-
ployment, and changes in the return to factors of production. The microsimulation
model has two building blocks: a labor participation model and an accounting equa-
tion. Based on Magnac (1991) and Cogneau and Robilliard (2001), I specify a labor
participation model to estimate changes in the labor conditions. Specifically, I use
the labor participation equations to estimate the probability to participate in the labor
market. Later, I use these probabilities to allocate labor in the microsimulation model
based on changes in employment levels from the CGE model. The second component
of the microsimulation transmits changes in commodity and factor prices following
Otchia (2014).
The labor participation model has four components: (1) a probit model of the deci-
sion to participate in the labor market, (2) a multinomial probit model of the allocation
of workers across sectors, (3) a bivariate probit model of the sectoral labor mobility,
and (4) a rule for labor allocation and wage determination. The model assumes that
workers can move from unemployment to employment status (or the opposite) and
can move from across sectors.12 In the first stage, I estimate the choice of individu-
als to participate or not in the labor market. I run a probit model of employment to
predict these probabilities, based on individual and households characteristics. The
equation of the model is
λi = prob(Ii = 1|zi ) = f (ziα + ui) (1)
where zi represents individual and household characteristics of the household head
such as age, gender, education, household composition; Ii is a binary variable which
takes 1 if the household head is employed and 0 otherwise; and ui is an error term.
Similarly, I use a multinomial probit model to estimate the probability to be employed
in each of the economic sectors, relative to the probability to be unemployed.
The second stage of the microsimulation model uses a bivariate probit model to
estimate the decision of current workers to move from one sector to another. This
model estimates the probability of workers to be employed in the new sector given
their current employment status.
In the third step, I transmit employment levels taken from the CGE model into the
microsimulation and determine which households are affected based on the job queu-
ing approach (Bibi et al. 2010). I rank the unemployed households by the decreasing
order of their probability of being employed. Then I use the changes in employment
from the CGE model to simulate the number of households who will be employed,
starting from households with higher probability. The number of workers is calcu-
lated by multiplying the variation from the CGE model to sectoral employment and
their labor income is the sectoral and skill level average. For sectors where employ-
ment shrinks, I rank employed households by the decreasing order to their probability
of being unemployed. Given the changes from CGE model, I assign them the status
of unemployed and their wage is set to zero.
When the demand for labor in one sector is higher than the supply from unem-
ployment, I allow employed households to move to the sector with lack of supply
12This is consistent with the labor market assumption in the CGE model, where labor moves to equalize
wage.
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based on their probability to move to other sectors. There is no cost of entry to the
new sector as the CGE model assumed that labor moves to equalize wage.
In the final stage, I feed the changes in factor income (dwl/wl), marketed com-
modities prices (dpg/pg), and producer prices (dphg/phg) obtained from the CGE
model into the accounting equation to determine welfare gains or losses of each of















where Ølh is the share of factor l in factor income of household h, θ
g
h is the share
of marketed good g in the total consumption expenditure of household h, θhgh is the
share of home-produced good g in the total consumption expenditure of household
h, and yh is the household income.
4.3 Growth-Redistribution Decomposition and Pro-poor Growth Analysis
In this study, I apply the pro-poor growth framework on the welfare changes from the
microsimulation to assess the pro-poorness of agricultural modernization strategies.
I follow Kakwani and Pernia (2000) to decompose the total changes in welfare into
two components: the pure growth effect and the pure inequality effect. Let LB denote
the distribution of income before agricultural modernization and LA, the distribution
of income after agricultural modernization. Then I write the growth rate in the mean
income γ as
γ = μA − μB
μB
(3)
where μB and μA are the mean of income before and after agricultural moderniza-
tion. Thus, I define the pure growth effects G as the proportional change in welfare
when the mean income changes but the distribution remains unchanged. The expres-
sion for the growth effects G is
G = P(μA,LA) − P(μB,LA) (4)
or alternatively
G = P(μA,LB) − P(μB,LB). (5)
Equivalently, the income effect depicts the change in welfare when inequality
changes, but the mean income remains constant. This can be expressed as
R = P(μB,LA) − P(μB,LB) (6)
or as
R = P(μA,LA) − P(μB,LA). (7)
13This equation is a variant of Chen and Ravallion (2004).
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Table 6 Decision matrix of Kakwani and Pernia index
Γ Φ Decision
Positive Positive Absolute pro-poor growth
Positive Negative Absolute non pro-poor growth
Positive Larger than 1 Relatively pro-poor growth
Positive Lower than 1 Relatively non pro-poor growth
Source: Author
Following Kakwani (2000), I decompose the changes in welfare PA − PB as
PA − PB = 0.5[P(μA,LA) − P(μB,LA) + P(μA,LB) − P(μB,LB)
]





PA − PB = G + R (9)
where G is the average growth effect, and R is the average income effect.
Based on this expression, Kakwani and Pernia (2000) introduced a pro-poor
growth index to assess to what extent growth enables the poor to actively partici-
pate in and significantly benefit from it. This index is called the Kakwani and Pernia
(2000) pro-poor index, Φ , and it is expressed as the ratio of the changes in poverty to
the change that would have been observed if inequality did not change. Algebraically,





Depending on the values of γ and Φ , the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) index can be
used to assess two types of pro-poor growth, namely, absolute pro-poor growth and
relative pro-poor growth. Table 6 summarizes the decision matrix for the Kakwani
and Pernia index.
Based on Kakwani and Pernia (2000) pro-poor index, Kakwani et al. (2003) fur-
ther developed a pro-poor index, the Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR) index,
that adjusts for the change in the growth rate. The PEGR is thus defined as the growth
rate that will result in the same observed level of poverty change had the actual growth
process not been accompanied by any change in inequality. Algebraically, the PEGR
is given by the product of Kakwani and Pernia (2000) pro-poor index (Φ) and the
growth in average income (γ ). It can, therefore, be written as
γ ∗ = Φγ. (11)
According to this expression, growth is absolutely pro-poor if the PERG index is pos-
itive. Similarly, growth is relatively pro-poor if the PERG index exceeds the growth
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rate in average income. In the same way, Ravallion and Chen (2003) propose a mea-
sure of pro-poor growth using the mean growth rate of the poor as a measurement
variable for the rate of pro-poor growth. They define the mean growth rate of the
poor as the average growth in income of households below the poverty line. Thus,
the Ravallion and Chen (2003) pro-poor index can be calculated as the mean of the
growth rate of each percentile of the income distribution up to the headcount index,
divided by the headcount index. This measure is equivalent to the actual growth rate
multiplied by the ratio of the actual change in the Watts index to the change in the
same index that would have occurred had growth been distribution neutral.
4.4 Determinants of Pro-poor Growth
The pro-poor growth framework described in the previous section is highly descrip-
tive and has limited policy implications. The reason is that this framework helps only
to identify the sources of poverty changes, and policies that can produce pro-poor
effects. In order to design a comprehensive policy package for agricultural transfor-
mation, I go a step further by ascertaining the relative contribution of specific factors
that can potentially increase the pro-poorness of agricultural modernization. I pro-
ceed as follows. I select one of the agricultural modernization strategies that pro-
duced pro-poor effects, and run regressions on its welfare changes. The regression
model includes variables that capture the heterogeneity of agriculture production,
such as household socioeconomic characteristics, farm structure, and farming sys-
tem.14 This is because the sole purpose of these regressions is to describe the profile
of pro-poor technological changes at the household level. I estimate separate regres-
sions for households in rural and urban areas, as the determinants of pro-poor welfare
gains, as well as the policy implications, might be different in these two areas. The
empirical specification of the pro-poor technological change, dWh/yh, is
dWh/yh = β0 + β1X1h + β2X2h + β3X3h + εi, (12)
where X1h refers to household socioeconomic characteristics, X2h represents the
farm structure, and X3h is a vector of other control variables. The vector of household
socioeconomic characteristics includes household composition, the share of house-
hold members participating in off-farm activities, and some characteristics of the
household head such as age and education. Farm structure is a vector of variables
related to farm-labor relationship, gender, and access to land, farm tools, and access
to credit. In the model, I allow for interaction effects between farm tools and access to
credit (farm tools#credit). This simultaneous effect of credit and farm tools intuitively
indicates the role of credit for purchasing farm machineries and implements. Finally,
I use three variables to control for household heterogeneity at regional level. These
include farming system, household index, and regional unemployment rate. Farming
system is a binary variable which classifies regions according to the production of
cassava, the leading crop in DRC. It takes a value of 1 if the region contributes less
14Excluding those variables may increase the risk of endogeneity and produce biased and inconsistent
OLS estimator.
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than 10 percent of total production of cassava, and 0 otherwise.15 Household index
is a composite variable estimated by applying a factor analysis. It includes house-
hold assets and building materials, access to cleaned water, proximity to school and
hospital, among others.
5 Results and Discussion
This section experiments and analyzes agricultural modernization strategies using the
methodology presented in the previous section. While the impacts of these policies
on pro-poor growth will be the focus of this analysis, it is important that I discuss first
the macroeconomic and sectoral effects of the experiments. Section 5.1 describes the
policies considered in this study, Sects. 5.2 and 5.3 present the results of the CGE
model on the macroeconomic and sectoral variables, and Sects. 5.4 and 5.5 present
the pro-poor effects.
5.1 Policy Experiments
I design experiments to examine policy options for the DRC to modernize its agricul-
ture and increase the income and welfare of households. In addition to their impact
on income, I analyze if those policy experiments are pro-poor. As I noted in the theo-
retical consideration, there are two schemes to modernize agriculture in DRC. These
are agricultural mechanization and chemicalization. On the order hand, I complement
this analysis with two scenarios of institutional changes that lead to an increase in the
supply of inputs. This is because institutional change is a key to the success of agri-
cultural modernization in DRC as transaction costs within the input supply system
are very high and there are no subsidies for inputs. Table 7 summarizes the policies
simulated under the five scenarios.
I conduct two sets of experiments to evaluate the pro-poorness of different agricul-
tural modernization strategies. The first set of experiments focuses on technological
change and includes three scenarios, of which two put emphasis on the mechanization
policies that change the factor intensities in the production of agriculture goods, and
one on the chemicalization policies that improve the efficiency in the use of chem-
icals. In Scenario 1, I assume that DRC adopts a capital-using technology in agri-
culture, increasing the capital intensity by 3 percent. Scenario 2 models the effects
of a labor-using technology that increases the labor intensity by 10 percent. In Sce-
nario 3, I implement a strategy for agriculture chemicalization. This scenario implies
that DRC farmers apply organic chemicals and best practices to increase the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of chemicals. This simulation also means that farmers invest
in soil and water management to increase the effectiveness in the use of chemicals.
Consequently, they can avoid the overuse of very expensive chemicals and increase
their time or frequency on the farm. Technically, I implement this scenario as a joint
simulation of a 10 percent reduction in the use of chemicals per unit of aggregate
15These regions are Kasaï Occidental, Kasaï Oriental, Maniema, South-Kivu, North-Kivu, and Kinshasa.
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Table 7 Design of policy experiments
Scenarios Description Design
Scenario 1 Capital-using technical change Increase of capital intensity (3 %) in
agriculture
Scenario 2 Labor-using technical change Increase of labor intensity (10 %) in
agriculture
Scenario 3 Improving the agricultural resource base
(teach farmers how to better use fertilizer)
Reduction (10 %) of chemicals per unit of
aggregate intermediate input
Reduction (20 %) of factor requirements per
unit of output
Scenario 4 Reducing fertilizer sourcing costs Reduction (50 %) of import trade margins for
chemicals
Reduction (50 %) of domestic trade margins
for chemicals
Scenario 5 Reducing fertilizer distribution costs Reduction (50 %) in import transportation
costs for chemicals
Reduction (50 %) in domestic transportation
costs for chemicals
Source: Author
intermediate input and 20 percent increase in the factor requirement per agriculture
output.
The second set of experiments considers a change in input markets related insti-
tutions. New institutions improve farmers’ ability to access fertilizers and chemicals
by reducing transaction costs in the procurement of inputs. The first experiment (Sce-
nario 4) consists of reducing the fertilizers and pesticides sourcing costs by lowering
imports and domestic trade margins by 50 percent. This can be achieved by cutting
out the middlemen or breaking the monopoly in the distribution of agriculture inputs.
Lastly, Scenario 5 models the effects of reducing fertilizers and pesticides transporta-
tion costs through the improvement of road and rail infrastructure and conditioning
of products. In the model, I simulate the reduced fertilizer distribution costs scenario
by assuming a 50 percent reduction in imports and domestic transportation costs of
fertilizer.
In these scenarios, I assume that the direct tax rates are fixed and government
savings adjust endogenously to ensure that government accounts balance. For the
saving-investment account, the balanced closure specifies aggregate investment and
government consumption as fixed shares of total domestic absorption. To keep in-
vestment fixed as a proportion of total absorption, the marginal savings propensities
of households and enterprises move freely and maintain balance between investment
and savings. Under this closure, agricultural modernization affects investment, con-
sumption and savings evenly to absorb the full effect of the shock. Thus, the magni-
tude of the change of household consumption depends on the magnitude of the shock
on savings, which in turn depends on the changes in investment and government con-
sumption. The foreign exchange closure assumes a flexible exchange rate maintains
a fixed level of foreign savings, which is consistent with the floating exchange rate
system adopted in the DRC. Labor is unemployed and mobile across sectors, given
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high unemployment rate among all labor categories. This assumption is justified, as
there is an excess supply of labor. In this case, real wage is fixed and the level of
employment adjusts to restore the equilibrium in the labor market. Capital, in turn,
is sector-specific but fully employed. Finally, the producer price index of non-traded
domestic output is the numéraire.
5.2 Macroeconomic and Sector Effects
Table 8 reports the macro results of policy experiments described in the previous sec-
tion. As expected, the impact of agricultural modernization is an increase in the size
of the Congolese economy. Under capital-using technological change (Scenario 1),
real GDP increases by 1.83 percent and total absorption by 1.80 percent. Because of
the saving-investment balanced closure, the increased total absorption forces total in-
vestment and government consumption to rise by 0.59 and 0.58 percent. The increase
of total investment depends also on the increase in government savings (1.99), as
public investment accounts for 41 percent of total investment. At the same time, en-
terprise and household saving rates decrease by 0.17 and 1.08 percent, respectively, to
match the value of investment. Private consumption increases by 2.04 percent while
household and enterprise savings increase by 0.42 and 2.01 percent. Despite the fall
in household and enterprise saving rate, savings by these domestic non-governmental
institutions increase because of the impact of capital-using technological change on
income. As a result of increased absorption, imports and exports rise, leading to an
appreciation of the exchange rate.
Labor-using technological change (Scenario 2) leads to a 2.19 percent increase
in GDP. Under this scenario, private and government consumption increase by 2.44
and 0.36 percent, respectively. Contrary to capital-using technological change, labor-
using technological change would cause an increase in household saving rate by 0.45
percent and firm saving rate by 0.07 percent. From a policy perspective, the increase
in household saving rate implies more private sector involvement in economic activ-
ity. In the case of agricultural households, savings can be invested in non-farming
activities as well as in fertilizers and seeds. Finally, the simulation reveals that the
real exchange rate appreciates by 1.75 percent, while exports and imports increase by
0.59 and 0.55 percent.
Scenario 3 indicates the potential impact of an improved agricultural resource
base. The first thing to observe is that GDP and total absorption increase by 1 and
0.98 percent. As expected, total investment, household and government consumption
also increase, due to the balanced closure. However, government savings decrease by
1.07 percent to balance government account because of fixed tax rates. Hence, only
household and enterprise savings fuel total investment. Household savings increase
significantly, reaching 3.71 percent, while firm savings increase by 2.25 percent. The
remarkable change in household savings is mainly due to the increase in household
savings rate (+2.36 %) as opposed to 0.36 percent for enterprises. Under this sce-
nario, exports and imports fall by 0.34 and 0.32 percent, respectively.
A reduced chemical sourcing costs and reduced fertilizer distribution costs (Sce-
narios 4 and 5) yield quite similar macroeconomic results. However, the reduced
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chemicals sourcing costs scenario gives better impacts, mainly in terms of GDP, pri-
vate consumption and total investment. The simulation exercise reveals that GDP in-
creases by 0.46 and 0.35 percent in both scenarios. Further, reduced chemicals sourc-
ing costs (Scenario 4) raises private consumption and total investment by 0.44 and
0.52 percent, while, under reduced chemicals distribution costs (Scenario 5), one can
observe a 0.32 percent increase of private consumption and a 40 percent increase in
total investment.
At a disaggregated level, capital-using and labor-using technological changes in
agriculture (Scenarios 1 and 2) generate spillover and lead to the expansion of other
sectors in the Congolese economy. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that agro-
industry related sectors benefit less from agriculture technological change than man-
ufacturing and service related sectors. For example, Table 9 indicates that under
capital-using technological change the value added of processed food and textiles in-
creases by 0.46 and 0.47 percent as opposed to 2.19, 1.40, and 0.73 percent for wood
products, utilities, and education and health. The small expansion of agro-industries
is due to weak forward linkages from agriculture and high transaction costs. This re-
sult reflects the dual characteristic of DRC economy where agriculture and service
sectors have strong linkages and play a more active role in the economy.
Concerning improved agricultural resource base (Scenario 3), Table 9 shows that
the contraction of the chemical sector is very pronounced compared to textile and
trade. When I reduce chemical sourcing costs (Scenario 4), the value added of wood,
trade, and mining decrease by 1.53, 1, and 48 percent. Similarly, reducing chemical
distribution costs (Scenario 5) causes a contraction of the transportation (−0.37 %)
and mining sectors (−0.13 %). Note that these two scenarios produce a very small
increase in agricultural value added. Agricultural value added increases by around
0.03 percent under reduced chemicals sourcing costs and around 0.02 percent under
reduced chemicals distribution costs.
5.3 Impacts on Factor Income and Consumption
Table 10 indicates the impact of agricultural modernization on factor income. Re-
sults show that capital-using technological change (Scenario 1) is skill-biased as it
favors workers with higher skill. Since I allow for unemployment and sectoral la-
bor mobility, changes in factor income are a response to the change in employment.
This result indicates that mechanization reduces the demand for rural low-skilled and
semi-skilled workers and increases the demand for rural high-skilled workers. In rural
areas, capital and high skill appear to be complementary as capital-intensive technol-
ogy increases the demand for high-skilled workers. High-skilled workers are needed
to operate tractors or to spray chemical as manual work is less needed. Thus, the
remuneration for rural unskilled and semi-skilled labor decreases by 3.12 and 1.35
percent, while rural workers with high skill levels see their remuneration increase by
1.74 percent.
Labor-using technological change (Scenario 2) influences labor income by in-
creasing the intensity of workers on the farm and, therefore, raising working hours
and the frequency of work throughout the year. Scenario 2 in Table 10 indicates that
labor-using technological change raises the returns for all factors involved in the pro-
duction process. As expected, rural workers capture higher benefits. However, it is
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interesting to see that many of the gains go to workers with lower skills. This is be-
cause agriculture uses low-skilled workers intensively. In addition, this scenario has
important implications for income distribution in both rural and urban areas, as gain
differences in favor of workers with lower skill are non-negligible. For example, the
remuneration of rural low-skilled workers increased by 8.48 percent whereas the re-
turn for semi-skilled and high-skilled laborers increased by 6.33 and 4.35 percent.
With regard to the improved agricultural resource base scenario, one can see that
the results are qualitatively similar with labor-using technological change. Returns to
labor are higher among rural workers than urban workers with similar skills. Under
this scenario, urban low-skilled workers gain more than urban semi-skilled and high-
skilled workers do. Table 10 shows that returns to urban low-skilled labor increased
by 0.92 percent while the returns for semi-skilled and high-skilled workers increased
by 0.45 and 0.24 percent, respectively.
Turning the attention to the institutional changes scenarios, simulation results
show that reducing fertilizer sourcing costs (Scenario 4) decreases the factor income
for all labor categories, except for urban high-skilled labor. Reducing trade margins
for fertilizers and pesticides lowers the price for agriculture intermediate inputs and
increases agriculture producer price. Rising producer price in agriculture, in princi-
ple, should lead to an increase in factor income of rural workers as they are inten-
sively employed in agriculture. However, the simulation indicates the fall of factor
income. Income for urban low-skilled and semi-skilled labor falls by 0.79 and 0.16
percent, respectively. In rural areas, the remuneration for unskilled and semi-skilled
labor drops by 0.48 and 0.65 percent, respectively, while high-skilled workers see
their remuneration fall by 0.55 percent. There are two reasons for this. First, the im-
pact of reduced fertilizer sourcing costs on agriculture value added is marginal, as
agriculture uses outdated technology. From a policy standpoint, this indicates that
technological changes play an important role in boosting agriculture output and pro-
ductivity. Second and most importantly, lowering trade margins leads to a reduction
of the producer price in the trade sector. This is due to the adjustment costs that oc-
cur when the Congolese marketing system transforms to a modern sector. Reduced
producer price lowers the value-added price and thus wages of most of the labor cat-
egories since this sector is the second employer after agriculture. To counterbalance
those negative effects on labor income, policies that break the monopoly of inter-
mediaries in agricultural trade should also aim to increase operational efficiency by
focusing on reducing the costs of inputs. This can be done when DRC public policy-
makers aim to improve ICT services to farmers by removing administrative barriers
that prevent the development of mobile banking, mobile remittance and the exchange
of agricultural input price information.
If improving institutions lowers the fertilizer distribution costs, as in Scenario 5,
then the income of all production factors will increase. Under this scenario, the
changes in income of rural workers are higher than those of urban areas. The high-
est increase is attributed to unskilled rural workers whose income increases by 1.38
percent whereas urban high-skilled labor’s income increases only by 0.24 percent.
Meanwhile, returns to capital and land are also high and reach 1.47 and 1.31 percent,
respectively.
Moving on to the consumption effects of agriculture products, Table 11 indicates
that mechanization of agriculture (Scenarios 1 and 2), leads to a decrease of the price




















































































































































































































































































































Journal of Economic Structures (2014) 3:8 Page 31 of 43
of agricultural products and an increase in the competitiveness of domestic prod-
ucts. Improving the agricultural resource base (Scenario 3) raises the market price
of agricultural products, but this leads to an insignificant fall in sales. On the other
hand, lowering chemicals sourcing costs (Scenario 4) reduces the market price of
domestic production marginally, whereas reduced chemicals distribution costs (Sce-
nario 5) increases the market price. Looking at consumption changes in Table 11, one
can see that agricultural mechanization (Scenarios 1 and 2) increases household con-
sumption of agricultural products from the market and their own production. Changes
from home-produced consumption are significantly higher than the changes in con-
sumption from the market. This is due to the high rate of subsistence agriculture and
significant price differences due to transaction costs. It is interesting to see that in
the case of an improved agricultural resource base (Scenario 3), home-produced con-
sumption increases to a lesser extent than marketed consumption. Finally, lowered
chemical sourcing costs (Scenario 4) reduces the consumption from own production
and increases consumption from markets. In this scenario, home-produced consump-
tion decreases by 0.12 percent while marketed consumption increases by 0.37 per-
cent. For the reduced chemicals distribution costs scenario (Scenario 5), one can see
that agriculture consumption from market and home production increases marginally.
However, it is important to note that market consumption increases more than home-
produced consumption.
5.4 Pro-poor Growth and Growth-Redistribution Decomposition
In order to understand how inclusive the different schemes of technological and in-
stitutional changes are, in this section I apply the framework of pro-poor growth
analysis on the welfare gains from the CGE results. Table 12 gives the estimates of
the growth in average income and six pro-poor indices. The pro-poor indices include
the Ravallion and Chen (2003) index, the Ravallion and Chen (2003) index minus γ ,
the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) index, the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) index mi-
nus 1, the poverty-equivalent growth rate (PEGR) index,16 and the poverty-equivalent
growth rate (PEGR) index minus γ . The Ravallion and Chen index, the Kakwani and
Pernia index, and PEGR index constitute the absolute pro-poorness indices. They in-
dicate whether the income of the poor has grown sufficiently after agricultural mod-
ernization for absolute poverty indices to fall. Therefore, a positive value of these in-
dices indicates that growth led by agricultural modernization is absolutely pro-poor.
The other three indices, the Ravallion and Chen index minus γ , the Kakwani and
Pernia index minus 1, and PEGR index minus γ , depicts the relative pro-poorness
of agricultural modernization. They demonstrate whether the income of the poor has
grown sufficiently after agricultural modernization to follow the overall increase in
average income (γ ). In this case, agricultural modernization is relatively pro-poor if
these indices take positive values.
Table 12 shows that all the three scenarios of agriculture modernization (Scenar-
ios 1, 2, and 3) lead to an increase in average income. This result is consistent with
16This index is also called Kakwani et al. (2003).
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the macro effects discussed in the previous section. Table 12 further indicates that
capital-using technological change (Scenario 1) is neither absolutely pro-poor nor
relative pro-poor, as all of the six indices are negative. This implies that agriculture
growth led by capital-using technological change decreases significantly the poor’s
relative shares in total consumption. In contrast, labor-using technological change
(Scenario 2) is absolutely pro-poor. This is indicated by the positive sign of the Raval-
lion and Chen index, the Kakwani and Pernia index, and PEGR index. In terms of
relative pro-poor effects, the Kakwani and Pernia index minus 1 and the PEGR in-
dex minus γ show that the growth rate of the poor’s income is enough to follow the
growth rate in average income. This gives evidence that labor-using technical change-
led growth is relatively pro-poor.
An improved agricultural resource base (Scenario 3), on the other hand, is ab-
solutely pro-poor as all the three indices are greater than zero. Looking at this in a
relative perspective, one can find that this policy is also pro-poor as the two relative
pro-poor indices are positive. Turning our attention to the reduced chemical sourc-
ing costs (Scenario 4), the absolute pro-poor indices are positive but not significant.
However, the results on the relative pro-poor indices indicate that reduced chemi-
cal sourcing costs are not relatively pro-poor. Finally, the last column of Table 12
presents the pro-poorness of reduced chemical distribution costs (Scenario 5). The
findings indicate that this scenario is absolutely pro-poor, but I have little evidence to
conclude about the relative pro-poorness.
Next, I am interested in understanding the source of changes in poverty due to agri-
cultural modernization. For this purpose, I decompose changes in poverty headcount
ratio in terms of the effect of growth and changes in redistribution. The first column
of Table 13 presents the growth-redistribution decomposition of the impact of capital-
using technological change (Scenario 1). Under this policy scenario, poverty head-
count ratio increases by 2.07 percent. However, it is interesting to see that without
any changes in inequality, capital-using technological change would reduce poverty
by 1.05 percent. The increase in inequality (+3.15 %) cancels out the beneficial ef-
fect of capital-using technological change-led growth on poverty reduction. Thus,
capital-using technological change leads to immiserizing growth. This finding cor-
roborates the ideas that poverty reduction due to growth led by large-scale invest-
ment in agriculture depends on the initial level of inequality in income or distribution
of assets. This is in line with previous research (Bourguignon and Morrisson 1998;
de Janvry and Sadoulet 1996; Timmer 1997; Ravallion 1997; World Bank 2000), sug-
gesting that the distribution of assets matters as it affects how well the poor connect
to the growth process.
In contrast, labor-using technological change (Scenario 2) causes a reduction in the
poverty headcount by 3.47 percent. 2.91 percent points of the 3.74 percentage point
fall in poverty headcount are due to the growth effect. This means that if inequality
did not change, poverty would be reduced by 2.91 percent. Thus, redistribution was
responsible for 0.56 percentage points of poverty reduction. These findings are con-
sistent with earlier evidence that unskilled labor-intensive agricultural activities have
higher poverty-reducing capacity compared to high-skilled, capital-intensive activi-
ties (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2010; Loayza and Raddatz 2010). Similarly, an improved
agricultural resource base (Scenario 3) reduces poverty by 2.71 percent. The growth
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effect contributes to 1.76 percentage points in poverty changes while the income dis-
tribution effect contributes to 0.94 percentage point.
Concerning the growth-redistribution decomposition of reduced chemicals sourc-
ing and distribution costs (Scenarios 4 and 5), one can observe in Table 13 that these
scenarios have the same qualitative effects. They both lead to poverty reduction as
would be expected. The growth effects of these policy scenarios contribute to re-
ducing poverty whereas the redistribution effects contribute to increasing poverty.
Nonetheless, the contribution of the redistribution effects is very low under reduced
chemicals distribution costs compared to reduced chemical sourcing costs.
5.5 Explaining Pro-poor Technological Change
I extend the pro-poor growth analysis by looking at the determinants of pro-poor tech-
nological change at household level. Recall from the previous section, I found that
labor-using technological change (Scenario 2) is absolutely and relatively pro-poor.
Therefore, I run regressions on its predicted welfare gains to ascertain the relative
contribution of relevant observed characteristics that can potentially increase the pro-
poorness of technological change. Table 14 gives summary statistics on the predictors
used in the regressions, broken down in rural and urban areas. In order to reduce any
potential endogeneity problems of some of the predictors, I choose to include in the
regressions only explanatory variables of potential relevance to agricultural and rural
development policies in DRC. The first set of variables consist of household charac-
teristics such household composition and the head’s education and age. I also use the
share of household members participating in off-farm activities as a proxy to measure
the importance of off-farm activities and thus household income diversification. The
second group of predictors is made up of farm structure variables such as farm-labor
relationship, access to credit, farm tools possession, and rights on land. Finally, I use
farming system, household index, and regional unemployment rate to control house-
hold heterogeneity at regional level. I define these predictors such that a positive sign
implies better pro-poor welfare gains.
Table 15 shows the results on the determinants of pro-poor technological change
derived from the regression model outlined in Eq. (12). They indicate that pro-poor
welfare gains increase with household size in both rural and urban areas. However,
the results suggest a strong negative and significant relationship between pro-poor
welfare gains and household composition, especially concerning younger household
members. For example, I find that rural and urban households with a larger share of
kids tend to have lower welfare gains. This implies that the number of children also
affects women’s choice to work on the farm, as women are responsible for most of the
on-farm tasks. Interestingly, I find that participation in off-farm activities is positively
correlated with pro-poor welfare gains in rural areas and negatively in urban areas.
This indicates that participation in off-farm activities has positive spillover effects on
pro-poor agricultural technological change in rural areas. An important reason for
this is that in rural areas, off-farm income is usually invested in modern inputs and
insurance. This finding is in line with other studies that found that investment in non-
farm activities can benefit the agricultural sector (Dorward et al. 2004; de Janvry et al.
2005).
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Table 14 Summary statistics on predictors in the regression analysis








Household size (log) 1.576 0.62 1.493 0.60 1.531 0.61
Share of kids in the household 0.181 0.18 0.195 0.18 0.189 0.18
Share of young in the household 0.454 0.25 0.460 0.25 0.457 0.25
Share of adults in the household 0.505 0.25 0.493 0.25 0.499 0.25
Participation in off-farm activities (share) 0.578 0.28 0.888 0.21 0.720 0.29
Age of household head (log) 3.741 0.31 3.699 0.33 3.718 0.32
Squared age (log) 14.095 2.33 13.794 2.44 13.932 2.40
Years of education (log) 2.099 0.53 1.758 0.59 1.923 0.59
Squared years of education (log) 4.687 1.90 3.438 1.83 4.043 1.96
Farm structure
Farm-labor relationship
Household head or spouse 0.250 Binary 0.632 Binary 0.457 Binary
Other household members 0.025 Binary 0.027 Binary 0.026 Binary
Wage workers 0.005 Binary 0.008 Binary 0.006 Binary
Sharecropper 0.000 Binary 0.002 Binary 0.001 Binary
Other 0.003 Binary 0.003 Binary 0.003 Binary
Male head with spouse without rights on land 0.803 Binary 0.834 Binary 0.820 Binary
Female head holding rights on land 0.003 Binary 0.001 Binary 0.002 Binary
Male head with spouse with rights on land 0.004 Binary 0.007 Binary 0.005 Binary
Farm tools 0.816 Binary 0.985 Binary 0.908 Binary
Credit 0.092 Binary 0.118 Binary 0.106 Binary
Regional characteristics
Farming system 0.333 Binary 0.154 Binary 0.236 Binary
Household index 0.835 1.10 −0.382 0.47 0.174 1.02
Unemployment rate 5.654 4.68 3.539 2.30 4.506 3.74
Source: Author’s calculation
In addition, I found that pro-poor welfare gains are inverted U-shaped in age of
household head in both rural and urban areas. This indicates that age has diminishing
returns, meaning that it is beneficial for pro-poor growth until 39 in rural areas and 46
in urban areas, after which increases in age will decrease pro-poor welfare gains. The
results for the years of education of the head are mixed. I find that education of the
head has a very small and non-significant inverted U-shape effect in rural areas, but
a significant U-shape effect in urban areas. To clearly highlight the substantive sig-
nificance of education, I estimate and present in Fig. 8 the predictive margins for the
years of education of the head in both rural and urban areas.17 Perhaps most striking
17For further details on marginal affects, see Cameron and Trivedi (2010).
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Table 15 Explaining pro-poor technological change led growth
Variables Rural Urban
Household composition
Household size (log) 0.262*** 0.327***
Share of kids in the household −0.216*** −0.308***
Share of young in the household −0.463*** −0.021
Share of adults in the household −0.381*** 0.112
Participation in off-farm activities (share) 0.219*** −0.181***
Age of household head (log) 7.549*** 7.029***
Squared age (log) −1.030*** −0.916***
Years of education (log) 0.007 −0.237*
Squared years of education (log) −0.010 0.098**
Farm structure
Farm-labor relationship
Household head or spouse (reference)
Other household members 0.027 0.054
Wage workers 0.415*** −0.060
Sharecropper 0.213 0.813
Other 0.174 −0.472*
Male head with spouse without rights on land 0.100*** 0.137***
Female head holding rights on land 0.004 0.351
Male head with spouse with rights on land 0.183* 0.454*
Farm tools 0.124 −0.543
Credit 0.166** 0.495***
Farm tools#credit (interaction term) 0.171** 0.571***
Regional characteristics
Farming system −2.606*** −0.660***
Household index 0.189*** 0.133***
Unemployment rate 0.452*** 0.127***
Observations 4767 2192
Adjusted R2 0.898 0.897
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Source: Author’s estimations
from Fig. 8, compared to the sign in Table 15, is the steady decline in pro-poor wel-
fare gains until approximately 5 years of education. From a policy perspective, this
finding means that every advance in post-primary education leads to higher pro-poor
welfare gains.
With regard to farm structure, Table 15 indicates the importance of land tenure sys-
tem, especially in favor of women. Results show that welfare gains tend to be higher
when women hold rights on land. As can be seen, welfare gains increase by 0.183
percent when the head of household is a male and the spouse holds rights on the land.
When the spouse does not hold rights on land, the increase in welfare gains is only
0.1 percent. It should be worth mentioning that this result is consistent in both rural
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Fig. 8 Predicative margins of
education of the head
and urban areas, with a higher magnitude for urban areas. Further, farm tools have
opposite sign in rural and urban areas but I fail to find any significant effect. However,
what is interesting to notice from the estimation results is that the interaction between
farm tools and credit is positive and significant. It is also worth mentioning that the
coefficient of the interaction between farm tools and credit is larger than the effect of
credit alone. Intuitively, this indicates the importance of establishing a specific credit
for purchasing farm tools.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
A common feature of CGE model results is that they depend on assumptions made.
In this section, I conduct a sensitivity analysis of the CGE model to ensure the ro-
bustness of the results. In the sensitivity analysis, I show the comparison for the sim-
ulation of capital-using and labor-using technical change with respect to the change
of the production factor elasticities. Table 16 presents some of the results obtained
when production elasticities of substitution increase or decrease by 5 percent.
I expected the magnitude of the results to differ because the nature of technical
change and the assumption on the elasticities of substitution are the main drivers
Table 16 Explaining pro-poor technological change led growth









GDP 2.61 0.37 2.66 1.80
Absorption 2.57 0.37 2.61 1.77
Private consumption 2.92 0.41 2.97 1.97
Government consumption 0.77 0.17 0.78 0.77
Total investment 0.78 0.16 0.79 0.74
Exports 0.67 0.14 0.68 0.67
Imports 0.62 0.13 0.63 0.63
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of model results.18 Nonetheless, the qualitative results and the signs are robust to
the changes in elasticities. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the capital-using
simulation appears to be less robust to higher production elasticities of substitution.
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In analyzing what are the better or worse models for agriculture modernization,
this paper found that the adoption of capital-using technology leads to immiserizing
growth through the redistribution effects. Results indicate that growth effects under
this technological change reduced poverty slightly, while the redistribution effects
canceled out the positive growth effects. This is because capital-using technologi-
cal change increased output in all the sectors, but lowered rural unskilled and semi-
skilled income so that there was an overall increase in inequality. Rising inequality
between rural workers with lower skill and the rest of workers emerged, a key factor
explaining the anti-poor effects of capital-using technological change.
In contrast, labor-using technological change is found to be effective in produc-
ing pro-poor effects in both absolute and relative terms. The analysis also pinpoints
the importance of labor-using technological change in improving urban-rural income
disparities. Despite the large income change in favor of rural workers with lower
skills, this result is partly due to the increase of home-produced consumption relative
to the marketed consumption. The findings on poverty decomposition demonstrate
that growth was responsible for more of the poverty changes than redistribution. This
finding suggests that labor-using technological change can be independently suffi-
cient in reducing poverty via the income growth effects. Under this scenario, I found
that household and firm savings also increased. This can be an indication of future
private investment in non-farm or fertilizer related activities. The improved agricul-
tural resource base scenario produced similar pro-poor effects to those in labor-using
technological change. Nonetheless, improved agricultural resource base has a limited
potential to enhance growth outside agriculture.
In addition, I tested two scenarios of institutional changes that lead to an increase
in supply of agriculture inputs. Firstly, the reduction of chemical sourcing costs im-
plies lower income for most of the labor types and produces insignificant absolute
pro-poor gains. From a policy perspective, this finding suggests that reducing trade
margins should be implemented simultaneously with institutions and policies that
increase farmers’ market power and improve marketing efficiency. Secondly, reduc-
ing chemicals’ distribution costs increases access to market for both producers and
consumers, and it leads to an increase in income for all labor types. Consistently,
this policy scenario produces absolute pro-poor effect but does not lead to income
convergence.
I continued the analysis by investigating quantitatively the determinants of pro-
poor growth, using welfare changes from labor-using technological change. Doing
so, I found that participation in off-farm activities is statistically significant and strong
determinant of pro-poor technological change in agriculture. Working as a wage
18See also Dawkins et al. (2001).
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worker improves pro-poor welfare gains only in rural areas. Other important find-
ings show that women’s land rights emerged as an important determinant of pro-poor
welfare gains. Credit is positive and significant in rural and urban areas but I have
not found significant effects for farm tools. Nonetheless, I found that there exist sig-
nificant interactions between access to credit and farm tools in producing pro-poor
welfare gains.
This research has intuitive findings for design and implementation of a pro-poor
agriculture modernization strategy. The key policy recommendations arising from the
paper are the following:
1. Public policymakers should promote the adoption of labor-using technologies to
enable the use of cheap labor to intensify agriculture.
2. Public policymakers should increase farmers’ capacity to evaluate, adapt, and dis-
seminate proven technologies.
3. Public policymakers should increase investment in soil and water management
methods, and in agriculture research and extension, to improve farmer’s ability to
use fertilizer efficiently.
4. Public policymakers should secure tenure among small-scale farmers and improve
access to land, especially for women.
5. Public policymakers should help farmers organize themselves into cooperatives,
break monopolies and cut rent seekers in seed supply and increase marketing effi-
ciency.
6. Public policymakers should reform input supply networks and increase invest-
ment in input storage and road infrastructure. These steps should be implemented
together with policies and institutions to remove credit constraint and increase
farmers’ ability to acquire tools and inputs.
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